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Abstract
It is almost a decade and half since freedom of expression has been proclaimed 
as one of the fundamental rights and freedoms recognized in the FDRE 
Constitution. However, there is hardly any Ethiopian jurisprudence on freedom 
of expression to speak of at the moment. Although numerous cases (that clearly 
gave rise to issues implicating freedom of expression) have been entertained in 
our courts, we have yet to develop a body of standards, tests and doctrines 
pertaining to the scope, content and legitimate limitations of freedom of 
expression. This void of constitutional jurisprudence can indeed undermine 
freedom of expression.
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Introduction
Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
FDRE Constitution. Nevertheless, as is the case for most of the rights 
recognized in this Constitution, there is still no corpus of academic exposition 
and judicial doctrine developed to elucidate on such matters as the scope, 
content and limitations of freedom of expression. This article is not meant to fill 
this void. Rather, it is meant to establish the existence of this void, to explore its 
causes and possible implications.
The article starts with a brief overview of the traditional theoretical basis of 
freedom of expression. That will be followed by a cursory discussion of
freedom of expression as provided under the FDRE Constitution. Then, some
critical questions that might arise in relation to freedom of expression are
discussed. The author argues that no authoritative answer has been given to 
these questions in the Ethiopian legal system and, as a result, there is a dearth of 
jurisprudence regarding freedom of expression in Ethiopia. An attempt is made 
to explore the cause for this jurisprudential dearth and some of its implications.
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1. Theoretical Basis of Freedom of Expression
Although not central to the principal objective of this article, which is to show 
the jurisprudential wasteland that freedom of expression has become in 
Ethiopia, in order to underscore the importance of the right, it would be helpful 
to explore the theoretical bases and underpinnings of freedom of expression. To 
this end, the main justifications that are often forwarded to establish the need to 
recognize and protect freedom of expression1 need to be highlighted.
1.1- Freedom of Expression as a Prerequisite for the Search 
for Truth
One of the earliest and better known defenses of freedom of expression was 
presented by John Milton who wrote a pamphlet, titled Areopagitica in 1644, 
decrying a scheme of licensing publications (a system of censorship) introduced 
in England at the time. Depicting the system of imprimatur as a peculiar evil of 
the prelacy (playing on the anti-catholic sentiments that were prevalent in 
England then), unheard of in classical Greece and Rome and without support in 
Christian theology, Milton defended freedom of expression as a prerequisite for 
the already discovered truth to thrive and for undiscovered truth to be 
discovered. He argued that censorship will be “primely to the discouragement of 
all learning, and the stop of truth, not only by the disexercising and blunting our 
abilities in what we know already, but by hindering and cropping the discovery 
that might be yet further made both in religious and civil wisdom.”2
This line of argument that defends freedom of expression as being a 
necessary precondition in the search for truth has been further developed by the 
utilitarian J.S Mill in his famous essay on ‘Liberty’. Mill argued that without 
freedom of expression we might be deprived of the opportunity to learn the truth 
if we have not discovered it yet, and we cannot perfect our partial knowledge of 
the truth we have learnt, or will not have the opportunity to have a clearer
1 One should bear in mind that there is an extensive body of literature on this subject, 
particularly emerging form the U.S and historically from English political 
philosophers of the enlightenment period. A review of this literature and its 
significance and relevance to Ethiopia merits a separate article. For a concise and up 
to date discussion of the theoretical justifications of free speech See, Eric 
Brandt(2005), Freedom of Speech, Second Edition, (Oxford University Press), pp 7­
23, See also Alan Haworth, Free Speech, Routledge 1998.
2 John Milton(1644,) Areopagitica, (The Harvard Classics. 1909-14), available at 
<http://www.bartleby.com/3/3/2.html>, last accessed on October 29, 2010.
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understanding of received truths.3 These philosophical views seem to have been 
judicially endorsed in the famous dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes of the 
U.S Supreme Court in Abrams v. United States wherein he forwarded the 
“market place of ideas” rationale for free speech.4
1.2- Freedom of Expression as a Pre Requisite for Self 
Governance
Another traditionally influential rationale of freedom of expression is the one 
expounded by A. Meiklejohn. This scholar and those who argue in favor of 
freedom of expression in a similar vein argue that the protection of free speech 
is justified since it is a prerequisite for self governance.5 The proponents of this 
view claim that democracy, as a system of self governance requires that citizens 
be well informed of issues of public interest so they could make informed and 
intelligent decisions taking into account all available alternatives. While 
basically subscribing to this rationale of free speech, some believe that this 
rationale of free speech limits the scope of the freedom to political speech and 
communication only6 while others are of the view that expressions that might 
not directly be characterized as being political such as art could be very 
influential in forming our political views and hence merit protection7. Although 
they might differ on the scope of protection, the proponents of both views seem 
to be in agreement that freedom of expression must be protected to enable 
citizens to govern themselves. Under Article 29(4) of the FDRE Constitution, it 
is provided that “the free flow of information, ideas and opinions... are essential
3 John Stuart Mill (1869), On Liberty, Chapter II: Of the Liberty of Thought and 
Discussion, available at < http://www.bartleby.com/13072.html > and last accessed on 
October 29, 2010.
4 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Holmes opined “Persecution for 
the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your 
premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally 
express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition...But when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas...that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”
5 See in general, Alexander Meiklejohn (2004), Free speech and its relation to Self­
government, (Law Book Exchange Limited).
6 Robert H Bork(1971-1972), ‘Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems’, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, pp. 6-28.
7 Alexander Meiklejohn(1961), ‘The First Amendment Is an Absolute’, The Supreme 
Court Review, Vol. 1961, pp. 245-266.
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to the functioning of a democratic order”. This assertion seems to imply that the 
necessity of freedom of expression for democratic governance has been the most 
dominant theoretical justification for the provision of the right in the 
Constitution.
1.3- Freedom of Expression as a Prerequisite for Personal 
Development
The other line of reasoning that is adopted to justify the protection of speech is 
one that makes human autonomy, personal development and fulfillment 
contingent on a person’s freedom to express one’s self as well as make 
independent choices of what is right and wrong, what is in good taste or bad 
taste. The argument goes, without such freedom, human beings cannot fully 
develop their personality and be autonomous moral agents with self respect8. 
Therefore, regardless of whether or not freedom of expression helps in the 
search for ‘truth,’ and in addition to the utility of freedom of expression in 
facilitating democratic governance, free speech is seen as something that is 
justified because it makes autonomous personal fulfillment and development 
possible.
The above discussion only highlights the most widely known traditional 
justifications of freedom of expression presented by philosophers and jurists of 
the English speaking world. Therefore it obviously cannot be taken to be 
comprehensive and exhaustive. Be this as it may, the author hopes that it can 
serve as a prelude to the discussion below.
2. Constitutional Guarantees of Freedom of Expression in 
Ethiopia
Freedom of expression was for the first time given juridical recognition in 
modern Ethiopia by the Revised 1955 Constitution.9 The Eritrean Constitution 
of 1952 had already recognized freedom of expression as a right of all residents 
of Eritrea prior to the adoption of the 1955 Revised Constitution which was 
influenced by the Federation with Eritrea.10 Freedom of expression was also a
8 See Thomas Scanlon (Winter, 1972), ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 2015-226 and David A. J. 
Richards(Nov., 1974), ‘Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of 
the First Amendment’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 1, pp. 
45-91.
See the 1955 Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia, Article 41.
10 See The Constitution of Eritrea, Adopted by the Representative Assembly of Eritrea 
on July 10, 1952, Article 22(d). The fact that the Constitution of Eritrea recognized
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right that was given recognition in the 1974 Draft Constitution.11 The 1987 
Constitution of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which had a clear 
socialist orientation, also gave recognition to freedom of expression.12 Hence, at 
least on paper, freedom expression has been given recognition in Ethiopia for 
more than half a century. However, anybody who is familiar with modern 
Ethiopian history would know that these constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
expression were not effective in fostering political dissent and freedom of the 
press. on the ground, there was hardly any free press or freedom for political 
dissent despite what these constitutions provided.13
A dramatic change occurred as far as freedom of expression was concerned 
with the collapse of the ‘Dergue’. Not only did the Transitional Charter 
recognize freedom of expression, 14 but freedom of the press and speech became 
a reality with an unprecedented proliferation of privately run newspapers and 
magazines.15 The extent to which that freedom has subsisted till this day is a 
debatable issue, but what is certain is that in our constitutional history, freedom 
of expression was stipulated in the 1995 FDRE Constitution in the most 
elaborate manner.
freedom of expression is obviously of interest here because at that point in time 
Eritrea was an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia.
11 See, The Draft of the Proposed Ethiopian Constitution, 1974(Presented to the Prime 
Minister on Hamle 29th, 1966 Ethiopian Calendar (August 9, 1974) and published on 
Addis Zemen Nehassie 4, 1966(August 14, 1974), Article 25(i). It provides that
..Every Ethiopian ....has the right to express any idea through the media of speech, 
press or any other medium. He has the right of access to the expression of others 
too.’
12 See the Constitution of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1987),
Article 47
13 Be this as it may it is important to note that there were exceptional times even in 
modern Ethiopia in which dissent through the press and political speech were briefly 
tolerated prior to 1991. In the 1920’s the progressive intellectuals who were 
infatuated with the then regent sharply criticized the ‘old school’ establishment and 
decried Ethiopia’s backward state openly in the few newspapers that were in 
existence at that time. Furthermore, just before the ‘Dergue’ consolidated its hold 
on power during the 1974 Revolution, political dissent and views critical to the 
government on newspapers were the order of the day.
14 See Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia (1991), Article 1(a).
15 See Shimelis Bonsa (2002), ‘The State of the Private Press in Ethiopia’, Ethiopia 
The Challenge of Democracy from Below, Edited by Bahru Zewde and Siegfried 
Pausewang, (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala and Forum for Social Studies: Addis 
Ababa), pp 184-165.
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Article 29 of the FDRE Constitution provides for the ‘Right of Thought, 
Opinion and Expression’ in the following terms:
1) Everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference.
2) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression without any interference. This 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any media of his choice.
3) Freedom of the press and other mass media and freedom of artistic creativity is 
guaranteed. Freedom of the press shall specifically include the following 
elements: (a) Prohibition of any form of censorship; (b) Access to information 
of public interest.
4) in the interest of the free flow of information, ideas and opinions which are 
essential to the functioning of a democratic order, the press shall, as an 
institution, enjoy legal protection to ensure its operational independence and its 
capacity to entertain diverse opinions.
5) Any media financed by or under the control of the State shall be operated in a 
manner ensuring its capacity to entertain diversity in the expression of opinion.
6) These rights can be limited only through laws which are guided by the principle 
that freedom of expression and information cannot be limited on account of the 
content or effect of the point of view expressed. Legal limitations can be laid 
down in order to protect the well-being of the youth, and the honor and 
reputation of individuals.
7) Any citizen who violates any legal limitations on the exercise of these rights 
may be held liable under the law.
in addition to enshrining freedom of expression as a fundamental ‘democratic 
right’, the Constitution stipulates that the third chapter of the Constitution (i.e. is 
its bill of rights) should be interpreted in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and international human rights 
instruments ratified by Ethiopia. 16 Accordingly, one should always bear in mind 
that the relevant provisions of the UDHR, the ICCPR (International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights), the ACHPR (African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) and other pertinent human rights instruments ratified by 
Ethiopia should be read alongside this constitutional provision in order to have a 
full picture of the legal regime that is expected to accord protection to freedom 
of expression in Ethiopia.
16 See FDRE Constitution Article 13(2), See also Gebremlak Gebregiorgis(2008), ‘The 
Incorporation and Status of Human Rights Under the FDRE Constitution’, The 
Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia : Challenges and Prospects, 
Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series Vol. 2, (AAU Law Faculty, AAU Printing 
Press), Girmachew Alemu & Sisay Alemahu (eds) pp 37-58.
4(2) Mizan Law Rev. Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia: The Jurisprudential Dearth 207
3. Questions and Issues in Need of Answers
At the moment, there is a great deal of controversy as to the extent of the 
realization of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression in Ethiopia. 
Accusations by various human rights activists and ‘champions’ of freedom of 
the press relating to deliberate acts of stifling freedom of expression through 
unconstitutional and illegal means are vehemently denied by the government.17 
Yet leaving aside this controversy, there are a number of questions that need to 
be addressed when we come to limitations imposed on freedom of expression in 
Ethiopia through duly enacted laws. The questions that could be raised are not 
only pertaining to laws that have already been enacted but potential limitations 
that might be set in the future as well. in this section of the article, some of 
these questions are raised along with tentative answers. The objective of 
providing these answers is not to provide definitive and authoritative answers 
but to explore possible answers and provide a starting point for further inquiry 
and debate on the questions raised.
The first question relates to the implications of the characterization of 
freedom of expression as a ‘democratic right’ under the FDRE Constitution. The 
second question concerns the legitimate grounds for limiting freedom of 
expression under the FDRE Constitution. And the third question relates to the 
extent to which limitations on freedom of expression based on legitimate 
grounds can go in restricting the freedom. it should be underscored that these 
questions by no means provide a guideline for a comprehensive and systematic 
investigation of freedom of expression as enshrined under the FDRE 
Constitution. However, they are still questions worth dwelling upon, both from 
practical and academic points of view.
3.1- Freedom of Expression as a Democratic Right:
Implications Explored
Freedom of expression is provided for under Chapter 3 of the FDRE 
Constitution, i.e. the bill of rights of the Constitution which embodies 
‘Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’. This chapter is divided in two parts. The 
first part provides for ‘Human Rights’ while the second part provides for
17 See Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2008 - Ethiopia, 29 April 2008, available 
at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4871f602c.html> [accessed 16 January 
2010], see also Committee to Protect Journalists (New York) Ethiopia: 2007 Press 
Freedom Summary, 5 February 2008, available at:
< http://allafrica.com/stories/200802060645.html > last viewed on January 16, 2009.
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‘Democratic Rights.’18 This division of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
recognized by the Constitution obviously gives rise to a question as to the 
practical significance and implication of the division. The relevance of this 
question goes beyond freedom of expression and is also pertinent to all of the 
other rights embodied in the FDRE Constitution. The most relevant provision in 
this regard is Article 10 of the Constitution. This Article is found in Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution that lays down the ‘Fundamental Principles of the 
Constitution’. Article 10(1) stipulates that ‘Human rights and freedoms, 
emanating from the nature of mankind, are inviolable and inalienable’ 
(emphasis added). It goes on to provide under Article 10(2) that ‘Human and 
democratic rights of citizens and peoples shall be respected’ (emphasis added).
Two things can be inferred tentatively from Article 10. The first tentative 
inference is that human rights and freedoms are derived from the nature of man 
and as such are universal. This is to mean that human rights are the rights of all 
human beings simply and merely by virtue of their humanity, as opposed to 
democratic rights which are the rights of citizens and ‘peoples’ derived from 
their juridical and political status. So this would seem to mean that in terms of 
the bearers of the right, human rights and democratic rights are different, the 
former being more inclusive than the later. The second tentative inference is that 
human rights are to be accorded a relatively more robust protection as 
‘inviolable and inalienable’ rights as compared with democratic rights which are 
just to be ‘respected’19.
These tentative inferences are further reinforced when one consults the 
Minutes of the Council of Representatives of the Transitional Government 
during its deliberations on what was then the draft constitution. when one refers 
to this Minutes, one can see that the Chairperson of the Constitutional Drafting
18 in the first part of the third chapter of the constitution, i.e. the part stipulating human
rights, one would find the Rights to life, the Security of Person and Liberty, 
Prohibition against Inhuman Treatment, Right of Persons Arrested, Rights of Persons 
Accused, The Rights of Persons Held in Custody and Convicted Prisoners, Non­
retroactivity of Criminal Law, Prohibition of Double Jeopardy, Right to Honour and 
Reputation, Right to Equality, Right to Privacy, Freedom of Religion, Belief and 
Opinion. In the Second part, i.e. the part providing for democratic rights, one finds 
Right of Thought, Opinion and Expression, The Right of Assembly, Demonstration 
and Petition, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Movement, Rights of Nationality, 
Marital, Personal and Family Rights, Rights of Women, Rights of Children, Right of 
Access to Justice, The Right to Vote and to be Elected, Rights of Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples, The Right to Property, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Rights of Labour, The Right to Development and Environmental Rights.
19 Abadir Mohamed (2008), The Human Rights Provisions of the FDRE Constitution in 
Light of the Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, (AAU Printing Press), p.85
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Commission,20 was of the opinion that a distinction should not and could not 
reasonably be made between the so called ‘democratic’ and ‘human’ rights since 
they are interdependent and inseparable.21 He also argued that the idea that the 
two rights should be accorded a different degree of protection is inappropriate 
and contrary to what is provided in the international human rights conventions 
adopted under the auspices of the U.N.22 A different view was forwarded by the 
then president and Chairperson of the Council, 23 who was of the opinion that 
human rights emanate from our humanity and cannot be subject to any 
limitations while democratic rights that arise out of citizenship and the status of 
people-hood or a membership in a particular group could be subject to 
limitations.24 The views of the Chairperson of the Council won the day and 
were accepted by a majority of its members.25 Unfortunately, the Minutes of the 
Constituent Assembly do not shed any light on the practical implications of the 
categorization of rights into human and democratic rights since the Constituent 
Assembly’s discussion on the provisions in question did not take cognizance of 
the issue. 26
one of the principal architects of the Constitution, while commenting on the 
Constitution, did not provide an explanation as to why it was necessary to make 
a distinction between ‘human’ and ‘democratic’ rights in the Constitution or 
what is the significance of the distinction. He noted that the classification of 
rights is “an accepted academic exercise”, at times of some political and 
technical utility so long as “the indivisibility of human rights is kept in mind”; 
and asserted that “it is in this light that the constitutional categorization of 
fundamental rights and freedoms into human rights and democratic rights should 
be accepted.”27 This assertion of course gives no explanation as to the practical 
implications of categorizing freedom of expression as a “democratic right” as 
opposed to a “human right.”
20 The late Kifle Wedajo, Chairperson of the Constitutional Drafting Commission
21 See Minutes of the 94th Regular Session of the Council of Representatives of the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia , Unpublished, p.23.
22 Ibid.
23 The President of the Transitional Government.
24 Id, p.24.
25 Ibid.
26 See Minutes of the Ethiopian Constituent Assembly Vol. 2 (Unpublished) pp 12-13, 
Tikmit 30- Hidar 7, 1987, Addis Ababa.
27 Fasil Nahum (1997), Constitution for a Nation of Nations; the Ethiopian Prospect, 
(Red Sea Press Inc.), pp. 111, 112.
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A legal expert who served in the Transitional Government’s Constitutional 
Drafting Commission which was responsible for the drafting of the FDRE 
Constitution, notes that although democratic rights enjoy lesser protection than 
human rights, the basis of the classification are unclear and ultimately the whole 
classification may be irrelevant.28 However she did not elaborate in what respect 
“democratic rights” are to enjoy lesser protection than human rights.
According to an academic on Ethiopian constitutional law, “.. .all categories 
of rights are co-equally to be respected without having any superior claim to the 
other in terms of being prioritized or subordinated”.29 He goes on to note that 
“there isn’t much of a method into the classification.” of rights in to 
democratic and human rights in the FDRE Constitution. 30
Clearly, in light of the opinions above, there seems to be an agreement 
among the commentators who have addressed the issue at hand that the 
classification of rights in the FDRE Constitution into human and democratic 
rights is not based on any rational justification and that it does not have any 
practical significance. This view which is shared by the above quoted sources 
seems to be inconsistent with what is provided for under Article 10 of the 
Constitution and how that provision was understood by some of the key players 
in the adoption of the Constitution.31
As has been discussed above, one of the implications of Article 10 at least as 
understood by the Council of Representatives of the Transitional Government 
(who constituted a majority in the Council) seems to be that the constitutional 
protection of those rights that the Constitution categorizes as democratic rights 
does not extend to non citizens. This line of thought invites one to compare the 
distinction between fundamental freedoms belonging to everyone under Article 
2 of the Canadian ‘Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ and democratic rights of 
citizens under Article 3 of the same charter. In this classification, the Canadian 
Charter stipulates that freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, 
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication; freedom of peaceful assembly; and freedom of association 
are fundamental rights belonging to everyone and not limited to citizens.32 It
28 Meaza Ashenafi (2003), ‘Ethiopia: Process of Democratization and Development’, in 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim ed., Human Rights under African Constitutions, 
(University of Pennsylvania Press), p.34.
29 Tsegaye Regassa(2009), Making Legal Sense of Human Rights: The Judicial Role in 
Protecting Human Rights in Ethiopia, Mizan Law Review, Vol.3, No.2. p.303
30 Id, 305.
31Supra note 21, p.23.
32 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Article 2.
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provides for the right to vote in an election of members of the House of 
Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership 
therein as rights belonging to Canadian citizens only.33 Hence, one can note that 
the Canadian Charter reserves for its citizens only rights that should inherently 
and in their very nature be reserved for citizens. As opposed to this, the 
Ethiopian Constitution seems to imply that many rights like freedom of 
expression are applicable only to citizens despite the fact that there is nothing in 
the nature of these rights that warrants reserving these rights to citizens only.
Furthermore the assertion that ‘democratic rights’ like freedom of expression 
do not emanate from the nature of mankind and as such are less deserving of 
constitutional protection is, to say the least, at the very fringe of plausibility 
within the realm of human rights. in relation to this, it is interesting to note that 
one of the widely accepted rationales for the protection of freedom of expression 
is the belief that this freedom is crucial for human autonomy and self 
realization.34 such views assert the existence of a direct link between human 
nature and freedom of expression. The interdependence, indivisibility and 
interrelatedness of human rights will undoubtedly render unacceptable any 
attempt to make a distinction in terms of the degree of protection merited 
particularly by civil and political rights.35 Therefore, in the opinion of this 
author, Article 10 of the Constitution and the categorization of rights under 
Chapter three of the FDRE Constitution as ‘Democratic’ and ‘Human Rights’ 
should be seen as a classification without significant impact as suggested by the
33 Id. Article 3.
34 see the discussion of rationales of freedom of expression in section i of the article 
and in general, Thomas I. Emerson(1963), ‘Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment’, Yale Law Journal 72 877-956, and Frederick Schauer (1982), Free 
Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
35 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, available at:
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?Open 
Document>, last viewed on January 15, 2010; See in particular paragraph 2 and 
Article 5 of the Declaration. The principle of universality, indivisibility, 
interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights has also been endorsed by 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights See Purohit and Another v 
The Gambia, 2003 African Human Rights Law Report 96 (ACHPR 2003) Paragraph 
48, See also the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action (1999) 
adopted by the OAU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, Article 1, Kigali 
Declaration (2003), Adopted by the AU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, 
Article 1.
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authorities whose views were discussed above.36 This line of interpretation 
would preclude the absurd outcomes that contradict with the view commonly 
accepted among scholars and practitioners of international human rights.
Regardless of the position of this author and some of the commentators 
whose views were discussed above, the fact remains that the text of the 
Constitution is still susceptible to an interpretation that will construe freedom of 
expression and other rights found in the second part of the third chapter as rights 
of only citizens and as rights that deserve less protection than rights embodied in 
the first part of the same chapter. Though this implication has not been acted 
upon so far, the potential it bears should give rise to some concern since many 
Ethiopian born political activists in the Diaspora could be precluded from 
enjoying the freedoms of expression, association and so on. Perhaps, we can 
take the “Broadcasting Service Proclamation No.533/2007” and the “Freedom 
of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation No. 590/2008”; 
both of which restrict participation in the ownership of media outlets to citizens 
only37 as manifestations of a reading of freedom of expression as a right 
belonging to citizens only.
As has been noted already, another practical significance of Article 10 could 
be its not so subtle implication that democratic rights are to be accorded less 
protection than human rights. As far as freedom of expression is concerned 
since it often clashes head on with the right to honor and reputation38, the right 
to privacy39 and at times arguably against the freedom of religion of others40, all 
of which are rights falling under the category of human rights of Chapter 3 of 
the FDRE Constitution, this could mean that whenever such a clash occurs,
36 The author concedes that the line of argument he is trying to push, even if supported 
by the authors cited above is not consistent with the original intent of some of the key 
players in the constitutional adoption process and as such it might be both 
problematic and mere wishful thinking.
37 See Articles 23 of the Broadcasting Proclamation and Article 5 of the Freedom of the 
Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation.
38 See for example Oberschlick (No 2) v Austria (1998) 25 EHRR 357 97/41, Lingens v 
Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 103 86/6 and, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Supreme 
Court (United States).376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Mogale and Others v Ephraim 
Seima, The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Case No 575/04, see also Fred 
Khumalo and others v Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, Case CCT 53/01.
39 See for example Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294, European Court of 
Human Rights application no. 59320/00.
40 See for example Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994) ECHR, I.A. v. Turkey, 
Judgment of September 13, 2005; Tatlav v. Turkey, Judgment of May 2, 2006.
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these rights should automatically prevail at the expense of freedom of 
expression. Unfortunately, though it has been more than a decade and half since 
the adoption of the FDRE Constitution, no jurisprudence has developed on the 
significance of the classification of fundamental rights and freedoms provided in 
the Constitution. The question will still persist until the emergence of a clear, 
authoritative and settled case law that affirms the formal equality of all 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution and that as a rule 
all such rights are to be enjoyed by ‘everyone’. 41
3.2- Grounds of Limiting Freedom of Expression
The first five sub-articles of Article 29 provide the rights associated with 
freedom of opinion and expression that are protected by the Constitution. 
Hence, these sub-articles tell us what is protected. Political speech, operating a 
press and expressing one’s views and opinions through state media are among 
the various rights protected under Article 26. Sub-Articles 6 and 7 deal with the 
limitation of the rights enumerated in the preceding sub articles. While sub­
Article 6 lays down the grounds and conditions for limiting freedom of 
expression, sub-Article 7 stipulates that “Any citizen who violates any legal 
limitations on the exercise of these rights may be held liable under the law”.
If read by itself without taking sub-Article 6 into account, this article might 
be understood as saying that so long as a limitation of the right has a legal or 
statutory basis, it is acceptable. such a reading is obviously very dangerous and 
must be rejected for two reasons. The first reason is the fact that such a reading 
will render sub-Article 6 meaningless and in effect negate it completely. if any 
limitation made in accordance with statutes was to be considered valid, then 
there would have been no need to provide grounds for limiting freedom of 
expression under sub-Article 6. This will render sub-Article 6 superfluous and 
will be contrary to the principle of positive interpretation.42 Furthermore, such a 
reading will have to be rejected taking in to account international principles of 
human rights which the Constitution makes the benchmark for the interpretation
41 in fact, many of the provisions in the second part of the third chapter of the FDRE 
Constitution, including Article 29, i.e. the Article pertaining to freedom of 
expression stipulate the rights they are providing for as rights to be enjoyed by
‘Everyone’ or ‘Every person’. Only Articles 33 (Rights of Nationality), Article 38 
(The Right to Vote and be Elected) , Article 39 ( Rights of Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples), Article 40 (The Right to Property), Article 41 (Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) and Article 43 (The Right to Development) are provided for 
Ethiopian Citizens, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.
42 Akhil Reed Amar (1998/99), ‘Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying 
Clauses, Seegers Lecture’, Valparaiso University Law Review, p. 2.
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of its bill of rights.43 These principles would require that we reject a reading of 
sub-Article 7 that will validate all limitations of freedom of expression 
prescribed by law.44 Therefore, sub-Article 7 should be seen as complementing 
sub-Article 6 and reiterating that so long as a limitation of freedom of 
expression is based on a law that meets the requirements of sub-Article 6, it 
would be considered legitimate. Such understanding will make sub-Article 6 the 
central article that needs to be analyzed in discussing the legitimate grounds for 
limiting freedom of expression.
Sub-Article 6 has three clauses. The first clause provides what kinds of 
limitations of freedom of expression are impermissible in addition to stating that 
limitations of freedom of expression can only be made through law. It provides 
that limitations on account of the content or effect of the view point expressed 
are not allowed. The first part of these prohibitions is a prohibition of “content 
based” limitation and seems to have been inspired by the US jurisprudence on 
“content based discrimination.”45 The second prohibition is a proscription of 
limitations on freedom of expression based on the “effect of the view point” of 
the expressed opinion. Its inspiration does not seem to be as obvious as that of 
the first prohibition. But one might contend that it is also inspired by US free 
speech jurisprudence on ‘view point discrimination’.46 This contention is fraught 
with troubles since the effect of a viewpoint is something different from the 
viewpoint itself. Hence, one could still argue that the U.S free speech 
jurisprudence prohibiting restrictions on speech based on the viewpoint reflected
43 Article 13(3) of the FDRE Constitution and Article 19(3)of the ICCPR
44 See in general Nihal Jayawickrama (2002), The Judicial Application of Human 
Rights Law; National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, (Cambridge 
University Press), pp 182-202 for a concise discussion of the principles of limitation 
of rights as developed by various international, regional and national human rights 
tribunals and courts. In addition to being prescribed by law, limitations of right must 
be necessary in a democratic society to advance the general welfare or the rights and 
freedoms of others, public health, public moral, safety, order or national security in 
order to be considered legitimate.
45 See Keith Werhan (2004), Freedom of Speech: A Reference Guide to the United 
States Constitution, (Praeger Publishers), pp. 73-74 for a concise introduction of the 
US free speech doctrine regarding content based restrictions. See also The _Oxford 
Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, Editors, Kermit L. Hall, James 
W. Ely, Jr., Joel B. Grossman, (2005), Second Edition, (Oxford University Press) p. 
949.
46 See R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) in which the US Supreme Court 
held that a restriction of speech based on the view point expressed as opposed to 
being based exclusively on the proscribe-able nature of the speech is not valid.
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in the speech is different from the prohibition of limiting freedom of expression 
based on the effect of the viewpoint of the speaker.
Naturally, questions might arise in relation to these impermissible grounds of 
limitation as stipulated under sub-Article 6. As far as content based limitation is 
concerned, one could ask if it is an absolute prohibition that would proscribe 
even limitations that are aimed at limiting the dissemination of materials with 
obscene content. Fortunately the answer for this query is quite obvious. Given 
that protecting the well-being of the youth is provided as an acceptable ground 
for limiting freedom of expression in the next clause of the same sub-article47 
and also taking into account the experience of other jurisdictions on the matter, 
one can safely assert that in relation to expression which contains obscenity, an 
exception can be made to limit freedom of expression on account of the obscene 
content.48
in addition to speech with obscene content, a question might arise as to the 
permissibility of limiting freedom of expression on account of its defamatory, 
profane or blasphemous content. Article 29(6) stipulates that preserving the 
honor and reputation of others is an acceptable ground for limiting freedom of 
expression. Hence as far as defamatory content of speech is concerned, the 
question could be answered by relying on the stipulations of Article 29(6).49
47 See FDRE Constitution Article 29(6), Second sentence.
48 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) in which the US Supreme court has ruled 
that obscene speech falls outside the protection of the First Amendment. The Free 
Speech Jurisprudence of the US is of obvious relevance in relation to the question 
dealt with above since there is a striking similarity between the terms used to 
proscribe certain forms of restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 29(6) 
of the FDRE Constitution and the free speech jurisprudence of the US Supreme 
Court. See also the Handyside v. United Kingdom (5493/72, a case decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights in which the Court has affirmed that protection of 
morals is a legitimate ground for limiting freedom of expression.
49 This assertion might not be entirely accurate when one takes in to account the fact 
that despite the general agreement that the need to protect the honor and reputation of 
others is a valid ground for restricting freedom of expression, there is an equally well 
established view to the effect that when an expression or communicative act pertains 
to public officials and figures or matters of public interest there should be a greater 
tolerance of freedom of expression even at the expense of the individuals whose 
honor and reputation might be tarnished by the expression. See , New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, Supreme Court (United States).376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Fred 
Khumalo and others v Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, Case CCT 53/01, See also Yonas Birmeta (2008), ‘Freedom of 
Expression and Crimes against Honor Under Ethiopian Law: An assessment of their 
Compatibility’, The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia:
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However, the question relating to profane or blasphemous content, particularly, 
whether or not such content justifies limiting freedom of expression can not 
readily be answered by simply referring to Article 29(6).
Comparative and international experience on the matter is divided. In Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the US Supreme Court has held 
that restrictions on ‘blasphemous’ speech is unconstitutional. Contrary to this, 
the European Court of Human Rights had upheld restrictions on blasphemous 
speech and expression of opinion by asserting that the freedom of religion 
requires such restrictions.50 A Court in South Africa has also upheld restrictions 
on expression of sacrilegious views asserting that such restriction is required by 
the right to dignity of the believers.51 Which approach to the issue best fits the 
letter and spirit of the FDRE Constitution and the needs of our society is an 
open-ended question.
The prohibition of restrictions on speech based on the effect of the viewpoint 
expressed is also another delicate question that arises in relation to Article 29(6). 
Does it mean that freedom of expression cannot be limited even when the view 
expressed by the speaker has the effect of unleashing ethnic or religious conflict 
and violence? Answering this question either in the affirmative or negative 
without any qualification would be dangerous. if we simply say ‘yes’ it would 
mean that we are sanctioning violence, death and chaos for the sake of 
protecting free speech. If we simply say ‘no’, we might accord constitutional 
validity to drastic and disproportionate limitations of freedom of expression by 
the sate regardless of how remote and unlikely the danger of violence is. There 
is also the risk of silencing critiques in the guise of limiting freedom of 
expression in the interest of public order.
The best way to deal with this dilemma would be to accept that the 
impermissibility of effect-based limitation has some exceptions. These 
exceptions to the rule will permit effect based limitation in relation to expression 
or speech having some predetermined effects. Common sense and the 
experience of even the most liberal jurisdictions support this view.52 In the
Challenges and Prospects, Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series Vol. 2, AAU Law 
Faculty, (AAU Printing Press), Girmachew Alemu & Sisay Alemahu( eds).
50 I.A. v. Turkey, Application no. 42571/98 of 13 September 2005.
51 Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncom Media Investment Ltd and others, a case 
before the High Court of South Africa (Witwatersrand Local Division).
52 The position of the US Supreme Court in relation to fighting words is a case in point. 
See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) in which the US 
Supreme court held that fighting words or words that are likely to provoke the
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Ethiopian context, the candidates for such exceptional treatment will be 
speeches or expressions that have the effect of causing ethnic or religious strife. 
Narrowly designing such limitation is important to make sure that the exception 
will not swallow the rule.53
However, the requirement as to the proximity and probability of the threat 
before a limitation could be legitimately imposed cannot in the Ethiopian 
context be set as high as the US Supreme Court's Brandenburg “incitement of 
imminent lawless action” standard.54 Granting the legislature some latitude on 
such matters might be quite advisable. So long as the legislation in place is 
genuinely designed and applied in a reasonable fashion and out of good faith to 
limit the expression of opinions that could cause ethnic or religious strife, 
limitations on freedom of expression should be considered acceptable.
once again it is important to remember that such effect based limitation is an 
exception that has been read into the constitutional text and should be strictly 
construed as an exception. Specially, care should be taken to make sure that 
expressions of opinions that are unpalatable for the powers to be are not stifled 
through this exception. The view to be expressed must be such that there is a 
reasonable and demonstrable likelihood for it to cause religious or ethnic 
violence in the foreseeable future for it to be legitimately limited. Any 
legislation or its application that is not designed to restrict speech that poses 
such a danger should be considered unconstitutional. This exception to the 
prohibition of effect based restriction should include speech that is likely to
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace are beyond the
scope of protection of the law.
53 See Attorney-General v Dow (2001) AHRLR 99 (BwCA 1992); to see the 
applicability of the rule that limitations of human rights should be construed 
narrowly.
54 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In this case, the US Supreme Court 
set the “incitement of imminent lawless action” test that should be employed in 
determining whether or not a speech is sufficiently inflammatory to justify restriction. 
The Court in this decision abandoned its earlier ‘clear and present dangef test. 
According to this new standard unless a speech, which is otherwise permissible (i.e. 
which is not illegal on account of being defamatory or obscene) cannot be forbidden 
unless it amounts to an incitement of imminent lawless action. Such a standard will 
be ill-suited in the Ethiopian context because of our ethnic and religious diversity 
which at times are sources of tension. one can easily imagine how any offensive 
remark about a certain religious or ethnic group, even if it does not qualify as an 
incitement to imminent lawless action, could easily result in violent conflict in our 
context.
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provoke violence from collectivities like religious or ethnic groups, or that 
would trigger a violent reaction from a reasonable average individual. 55
This approach that does not correspond with the ‘clear and present danger’ 
test or the ‘incitement of imminent lawless action’ test of the US Supreme 
Court56 seems best suited for the Ethiopian context. The ‘clear and present 
danger’ test if taken quite literally, or the ‘incitement of imminent lawless 
action’ test as it is seems to be ill-suited in the Ethiopian context for two 
reasons. The first reason is the fact that the ‘incitement of imminent lawless 
action’ test is too exacting a standard to adopt in a country like Ethiopia. This is 
because according protection to speech that is not an incitement to imminent 
ethnic or religious violence but which still is an advocacy for such violence 
should not be tolerated. Obviously, tolerating such a speech will be a gravely 
irresponsible act. Making a distinction between advocacy and incitement seems 
to be playing with fire in light of the current reality of Ethiopia. Furthermore, 
the clear and present danger test with its convoluted history and excess baggage 
is clearly not advisable to be adopted in Ethiopia.
So far we have seen the clauses that provide the grounds which the FDRE 
Constitution has specifically singled out as being impermissible grounds of 
limiting freedom of expression. We have also tried to see what exceptions must 
reasonably be read into these clauses in light of the experience of other 
jurisdictions and the Ethiopian reality. However, limiting only, speech that 
could cause ethnic and religious violence does not seem to be reasonable. After 
all, there are other possible effects of speech that would justify limiting freedom 
of expression even in a democratic society. As far as these are concerned, the 
remaining two sentences or clauses of sub-Article 6 could give us a partial 
answer. The second clause provides that freedom of expression may be limited 
to protect the well-being of the youth and the honor and reputation of 
individuals. The third clause provides that any propaganda of war and the public 
expression of opinion intended to injure human dignity shall be prohibited by 
law. Hence, from these clauses it is clear that certain types of speech could be
55 See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) in which the US 
Supreme court held that fighting words or words that are likely to provoke the 
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace are beyond the 
scope of protection of the law.
56 The South African functional equivalent of this test is the “reasonable and justified” 
test. According to this standard that emanates from Article 36(1) of the South African 
Constitution, to conclude that a limitation of freedom of expression is justified, it 
must be a reasonable and justified limitation of the right to freedom of expression in 
an open and democratic society. See for example the South African National Defence 
Union v Minister of Defence, South African Constitutional Court CCT 22/98.
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or should be limited based on the effect they might have and also based on the 
intention of the speaker.
The third clause of sub-Article 6 imposes an obligation on the legislature to 
enact laws that prohibit propaganda of war and also speech that is intended to 
injure human dignity. These could be taken as exceptions to the effect and 
content based limitation prohibition of the first clause. on the other hand, the 
second clause gives the legislature permission to enact laws that would protect 
the well being of the youth and the honor and reputation of individuals. This 
difference between giving permission in relation to the well being of the youth 
and imposing a duty in relation to propaganda of war and human dignity, could 
have been intended to reflect the importance attached to human dignity and 
peace by the framers of the Constitution. When one takes into account the 
horrors of civil war and various atrocities that were in the background of the 
constitution making process, this is quite understandable. so, from the second 
and the third provisions, the need to outlaw propaganda of war, and the 
protection of the well being of the youth, and the honor and reputation of 
individuals emerge as legitimate grounds of limiting freedom of expression on 
account of its effect. Hence, these constitute additional exceptions to the 
prohibition of effect and content based limitations that are imposed as a 
principle in the first clause of sub-Article 6.
To recap the discussion so far, sub-Article 6 of Article 29 has three clauses. 
The first one requires limitations on freedom of expression through laws that are 
not based on account of the effect or content of the law. This principle is 
supposed to guide all limitations on freedom of expression. The second clause 
permits limitations on freedom of expression for the sake of protecting the well­
being of the youth and the honor and reputation of individuals while the third 
clause requires limitations to proscribe propaganda of war and protect human 
dignity. in addition to these four grounds of limiting freedom of expression, we 
have also read into the Constitution the prevention of ethnic and religious 
conflicts as a legitimate ground of limiting freedom of expression.
The discussion in relation to speech or publications that could have the effect 
of causing ethnic and religious conflict shows that reasonably and out of 
necessity the list of grounds for limiting freedom of expression, expressly 
mentioned in the Constitution cannot be taken as an exhaustive list. Though the 
list might appear to be exhaustive, it leaves out some grounds of limitation that 
are usually considered as legitimate grounds of limiting free speech such as 
national security57 and the need to uphold the integrity of the judicial process
57 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) and The Observer 
and The Guardian v. United Kingdom (“The Spycatcher Case”) European Court of 
Human Rights 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991), See also The Johannesburg
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and the fair trial rights of individuals.58 This implies that the list cannot 
reasonably be taken as exhaustive. The danger of this implication is that it seems 
to invite additions of other “reasonable” grounds of limitation which might at 
the end of the day result in a very long list that would jeopardize freedom of 
expression.
Therefore, when introducing or acknowledging any new ground of limitation 
as constituting a legitimate ground of limiting free speech, extraordinary care 
should be taken. For instance, any such ground should be aimed at the 
protection of the fundamental rights of others like the right to a fair trial or it 
should be aimed at protecting a compelling state interest like national security. 
Furthermore, such new grounds to be read into the text by way of interpretation 
should be grounds of limiting freedom of expression recognized in established 
democracies or international human rights instruments Ethiopia has ratified.59 
Given that the Constitution, in principle, precludes limitation of freedom of 
expression based on the content or effect of the opinion being expressed, it 
should always be remembered that any ground of limitation is an exception and 
that such ground should be read very narrowly both in its introduction and 
construction.
3.3- Quantum of Limitations
Once we have a fair idea of what constitute legitimate grounds of limiting 
freedom of expression, then the next question would be to what extent could the 
state go in limiting the rights based on these grounds. How far can the state go 
in protecting human dignity, individual honor and reputation or the integrity of 
the judicial process? There are some points that are worth noting in relation to 
this. First, we might end up in a situation in which excessive limitations based
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 
available at <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf>, last 
viewed on January 15, 2010, These Principles were adopted on 1 October 1995 by a 
group of experts in international law, national security, and human rights convened 
by Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, in collaboration with the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand, in 
Johannesburg. These Principles have been endorsed by Mr. Abid Hussein, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, in his reports to the 
1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001 sessions of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, and referred to by the Commission in its annual resolutions on freedom of 
expression every year since 1996.
58 See Branzburg v. Hayes , 408 U.S. 665 (1972) and Gannett Co. v. DePasqual443 
U.S. 368 (1979) and State v Mamabolo CCT 44/00, MidiTelevison v Director of 
Public Prosecution Case No. 100/06.
59 See Article 13(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
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on legitimate grounds would severely undermine freedom of expression (even 
when there is a legitimate ground for limiting freedom of expression), unless 
some restrictions are set on the extent to which the state can limit freedom of 
expression. Therefore, some form of limitation on the limitations themselves is 
necessary.60
The text of the Constitution already sets a limitation on the form which the 
limitations can take. it provides that the limitations have to be made through 
law, and this rules out limitations that are not prescribed by the law even if they 
are based on a legitimate ground. Other than this formal requirement, the text of 
the Constitution does not provide any substantial restriction on limitations to be 
imposed on freedom of expression based on legitimate grounds. Hence, 
adopting some substantive restrictions on the limitations that could be set by the 
state on freedom of expression is necessary. That is why, in most democratic 
countries, the proportionality test/analysis (which requires that any limitation 
imposed on a right be proportionate to the legitimate aim being perused) is 
employed to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable limitations on human 
rights.61
There are also some other considerations that need to be taken into account, 
especially in relation to the purposes and nature of freedom of expression and 
also the specific Ethiopian context. it is very difficult to ascribe one single 
overriding purpose or function to freedom of expression. one cannot fail to 
acknowledge that debate on issues of public concern, facilitating self 
governance and the democratic process are some of the most important 
functions of freedom of expression.62 In addition to these, freedom of expression 
seems to be of such a 'fragile' nature that limitations upon it could have an 
unintended “chilling effect” unless care is taken in designing and implementing 
laws limiting the freedom.63 Particularly, in the Ethiopian context there is a need 
for being highly conscious of the nature and function of freedom of expression.
60 See the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984). Available at
<http://graduateinstitute.ch/faculty/clapham/hrdoc/docs/siracusa.html>, last viewed on 
January 15, 2010.
61 Andrew Clapham (2007), Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford 
University Press) , p.99.
62 See Article 29 (4) which provides that “...the fee flow of information, ideas and 
opinions .are essential to the functioning of a democratic order.” See also 
Meiklejohn (1961), Supra note 7.
63 See Frederick Schauer (1978), ‘Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the 
Chilling Effect’, Boston University Law Review, 58.
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The political culture of Ethiopia is very intolerant of dissent and criticism in 
public.64 A challenge or criticism of decisions (or policies), or questioning the 
competence of those in power had been considered as a rebellion and treason. 
This makes freedom of expression very fragile in Ethiopia and will also make 
the potential chilling effect of limitations on the freedom more pronounced. 
Hence, it’s important to make sure that limitations, even those based on 
legitimate grounds will be carefully scrutinized when they relate to expression 
of opinions related with political matters. Such scrutiny must preclude the 
stifling of dissent while protecting the honor and reputation of individuals, 
national security and the like. Furthermore, given that it has the function of 
aiding self governance and facilitating the democratic process, a careful and 
critical scrutiny of the magnitude of restrictions on freedom of expression is 
crucial to protect people from various forms of interference and pressure in the 
exercise of their rights.
4. The State of the Freedom of Expression Jurisprudence in 
Ethiopia
The questions raised in the preceding sections are not simply of academic 
interest. The experience of the various jurisdictions that have been cited show 
that the questions are practical and require judicial answers, in addition to which 
academic discourse can have a significant contribution. These important 
questions do not have authoritative answers within our legal system. The present 
author has given some tentative answers as to how these questions should be 
addressed within our constitutional system. But these are tentative answers and 
there is hardly a body of case law or authoritative doctrinal writing that could be 
used to confirm or repudiate the answers provided above.65 Neither the House of 
Federation (the body entrusted with the ultimate authority of interpreting the 
Constitution) nor the ordinary judiciary has developed settled and specific 
standards, tests and principles that could be used in resolving cases arising in
64 See infra note 75.
65 Of course, there is an impressive body of legislation (if not in terms of quality, at least 
in terms of volume) relating to freedom expression (See the “Freedom of the Mass 
Media and Access to Information Proclamation No. 590/2008” and the “Broadcasting 
Service Proclamation No.533/2007”. Hence, one could argue that this corpus of 
legislation should be taken as part of an Ethiopian freedom of expression 
jurisprudence. However, such argument with all its merit is not convincing since the 
questions that arose in the previous section (Section 3), cannot be answered by 
referring only to the legislations in question. while conceding that these statues are 
important and could form part of an Ethiopian free speech jurisprudence, they will be 
quite inadequate by themselves.
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relation to freedom of expression. In fact, the former has not yet rendered a 
constitutional interpretation that directly involves freedom of expression and so 
far it has not given any decision that would shed light on its position as far as 
Article 29 is concerned.66 Furthermore, the ordinary courts which routinely 
entertain criminal and civil cases that have a direct bearing on freedom of 
expression have hardly addressed the questions raised above.
The author of this article will discuss the following few cases to illustrate the 
manner in which the ordinary courts have handled cases pertaining to freedom 
of expression without sufficiently taking into account the implications of Article 
29.
In Public Prosecutor v Asrat W. (Cr. F.N 74910), the defendant was charged 
for failing to comply with Article 10(1), (2) (a) and 20 of the press proclamation 
No. 34/199267 and also Article 34(1) (a) of the Criminal Code.68 The charges
66 See Journal of Constitutional Decisions (Hamle 2000), Vol.1., Number 1, ( House 
of Federations) in Amharic
67 A proclamation to provide for the Freedom of the press, proclamation No. 34/1992. 
Article 10 of this proclamation provides for the duty of the press to ensure the 
lawfulness of the contents of press products as follows; “(1) Every press has the duty 
to ensure that any press product it circulates is free from any content that can give 
rise to criminal and civil liability. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub­
article 1 of this Article, any press shall have the duty to ensure that any press product 
it issues or circulates is free from: a. any criminal offence against the safety of the 
state or of the administration established in accordance with the Charter or of the 
national defence force; b. any defamation or false accusation against any individual 
nation/nationality, people or organization; c. any criminal instigation of one 
nationality against another or incitement of conflict between peoples; and d. any 
agitation for war. (3) Responsibility for carrying out the duties specified under sub­
articles 1 and 2 of this Article shall lie as follows: a. in the case of a periodical press 
such as a newspaper, magazine or journal, on the concerned editor, journalists or 
publisher; b. in the case of press other than those specified under this sub-article 
3(a), on the publisher; c. in the case any press product disseminated by radio or 
television, on the concerned journalist and program editor.”
Article 20(1) of the same proclamation provides that;“Where any press is found to 
have failed to carry out its duties under sub-articles 1 and 2 of Article 10 of this 
Proclamation, the person liable pursuant to sub-article 3 of Article 10 shall, without 
prejudice to the liabilities and penalties under the penal Code, be punishable with 
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year and not more than three (3) years or with 
a fine of not less than Birr ten thousand (Birr 10,000) and not more than fifty 
thousand (Birr 50,000) or with both such imprisonment and fine. “
68 Article 34(1)( a) provides for ‘ Liability for Crimes Committed through the Mass 
Media’ by stipulating that ‘ (1) Criminal liability for crimes committed through
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arose in connection with a report published in a newspaper called Seifenebelbal. 
The report in question alleged that two individuals who were suspected of being 
OLF members and who were detained in secret prisons had died and their 
bodies had been thrown away in a certain locality in Addis Ababa. The accused 
argued that his newspaper has merely reported what was reported on the Voice 
of America Radio. The Court reasoned that, the accused as the editor-in-chief 
of the newspaper which carried this news had the ultimate duty to ensure the 
lawfulness of the content of whatever was published in the newspaper and 
particularly, he had the duty of taking into account the implications and 
potential effects of what was being published for the security of the state. 
Accordingly, the Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to one year of 
imprisonment.
it is interesting to note that the Court did not bother to ascertain what the 
exact criminal offense against the safety of the State or of the government or of 
the national defense force is? and whether all the factual elements of this offense 
have been fulfilled? Nor did the Court elaborate on the duty of the press to be 
conscious of the effects of what is being published on the security of the state. 
Particularly, the court did not raise any questions or shed any light as to the 
implications and compatibility of such a duty, i.e. the duty of newspapers and 
other publications to be mindful of their effects in line with the constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom of expression.
In the case of Public Prosecutor v Takele K. and Daniel G. (Cr. F.N 72175), 
the accused was charged with the violation of Article 10(1), 10 (2)(b) and 20(1) 
of the Press Proclamation No. 34/1992. The circumstances that constituted the 
factual ground for the charge relate to a report published on a newspaper called 
Zarenew. in this report it was alleged that a certain minister had asserted in a 
meeting that [measures] should be taken not only against members of the OLF 
armed forces but also all Oromos reflecting the organization’s views. The 
defendant did not try to challenge either the factual or legal arguments presented 
against him, rather he informed the Court that he was only the nominal editor- 
in-chief and he was not involved in any capacity in the work of the news 
paper.69 Accordingly, the Court convicted the accused although it suspended the 
sentence.
periodicals shall be as follows: (a) a person who was registered as editor in chief or 
deputy editor when the periodical was published shall be liable...’
69 Trying to avoid the not so infrequent arrest and charges brought against them, actual 
editor in chiefs of privately owned newspapers used to hire a nominal editor-in-chief 
(an editor-in-chief in title or name only) who will take the fall for them whenever 
charges are pressed in relation with what is published in the newspaper. The New
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Once again, the Court did not raise any questions as to the compatibility of 
freedom of expression as embodied in the Constitution and restricting freedom 
of expression on a matter of public interest. The Court did not inquire if 
imposing a duty on reporters to guarantee complete factual accuracy of all their 
reports, a strict liability of sorts without any qualification and excuse, is in 
conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. obviously, if a member 
of the cabinet had expressed the sort of opinion that the minister in question was 
allegedly said to have expressed, then it is something news-worthy and 
deserving public debate. Naturally the public has an interest in being informed 
of and subjecting to scrutiny the opinions held by public official on matters of 
public interest. so the court should have inquired as to who should bear the 
burden of proving the falsity or truthfulness of the reported statement? in light 
of the public interest to be kept informed on matters of public interest by the 
press, should the press bear the heavy burden of guaranteeing the truthfulness of 
everything that they publish? What should happen if a press outlet publishes 
something that is not true under a mistaken assumption that what is being 
published is true after engaging in a reasonable, however unfruitful, effort to 
verify the veracity of the publication? All these questions were germane to the 
case at hand and crucial in developing a jurisprudence of freedom of expression. 
These questions were not raised by the court at all.
In Public Prosecutor vMesfin N. (Cr.F.N 71556), the defendant was accused 
of violating Article 10(1), 10 (2)(b) and 20(1) of the Press Proclamation No. 
34/1992. The public prosecutor alleged that the accused had intentionally 
defamed the private complainants in the case. The Court acquitted the defendant 
since he was able to show to the satisfaction of the court the truthfulness of the 
report in question through documentary evidence. once again no flags were 
raised to interrogate the legal basis for the criminal charge in light of the 
Constitution. To some extent, the questions that were raised in the previous 
paragraph as being germane for Public Prosecutor v Takele K. and Daniel G. 
(Cr. F.N 72175) are also relevant in this case.
In Public Prosecutor v Ibrahim M. (Cr.F.N 71562), the public prosecutor’s 
charge invoked Article 10(1), (2) (c) and 20(1) of the Press Proclamation No. 
34/1992. The charges arose as a result of an opinion published in a religious 
newspaper called Islamia, the editor-in-chief of which was the accused. The 
article that was published in the newspaper accused the Minster of Education of 
harboring hatred against Ethiopian muslims and deliberately attempting to deny 
them their constitutionally guaranteed rights. These accusations were made in a 
rather colorful language and very strong words. The accused argued that the
Criminal Code has provisions intended to put an end to this practice. See Article 
43(1) (c) of the Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
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prosecutor has not proved the falsity of what was asserted in the piece published 
by the newspaper. The accused further argued that he should not be found guilty 
since the author of the piece in question was exercising his freedom of 
expression when he wrote the article in question.
As opposed to all the cases discussed above, the judge engaged in an analysis 
of freedom of expression under the FDRE Constitution. She asserted that 
although freedom of expression is enshrined under Article 29 of the FDRE 
Constitution, the right is not an absolute right. She went on to point out that 
there are certain circumstances under which the right could be limited according 
to Article 29(6) of the FDRE Constitution. The judge went further and asserted, 
and with all due respect erroneously, that the content and effect of a viewpoint 
are stipulated as legitimate grounds for the limitation of freedom of expression 
under Article 29(6) of the FDRE Constitution. However, as it has been
discussed above, this is clearly the exact opposite of what the Constitution
provides. To say the least, the judge misread Article 29(6) of the Constitution 
and concluded that it allows what it explicitly prohibits. As astonishing as this 
might be, Article 29(6) was construed as having a meaning that is diametrically 
opposed to its plain meaning.
while these cases cannot be said to be sufficiently large enough to draw
definite conclusions regarding the state of jurisprudence of freedom of
expression in Ethiopia, they can shed some light on the situation and enable us 
to make some inferences. The first thing one can note in relation to the above 
cases is that, in most of the cases, the courts went on and applied the statutory 
provisions invoked by the public prosecutor without any attempt to attenuate the 
concerns that might arise in connection with the adverse implications of these 
provisions for freedom of expression and the press. with the exception of one 
case in which the defendant invoked freedom of expression as a defense,70 in all 
other cases, freedom of expression and the concerns attendant to it in relation to 
press crimes were not given any consideration in the decisions of the courts. 
Even in the case where freedom of expression was given consideration in the 
disposition of the case, its consideration obviously left a lot to be desired. To 
start with, the Court read the prohibition set down by the Constitution as 
permission and accordingly concluded that what are provided as illegitimate 
grounds for limiting freedom of expression are legitimate grounds of limiting 
the freedom.
Therefore, in all the above cases, one cannot see the courts inquiring whether 
or not the interest being advanced by the statutes that were invoked by the 
public prosecutor are interests that could be taken as legitimate grounds for
70 Public Prosecutor v Ibrahim M. (Cr.F.N 71562).
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limiting freedom of expression in accordance with Article 29(6) of the 
Constitution. In the absence of such inquiry, it is no surprise that the courts have 
not proceeded to raise questions regarding the proportionality or the quantum of 
limitation. This is so because, reasonably, the judicial analysis of proportionality 
of limitations is always preceded by an inquiry as to the existence of legitimate 
grounds for limiting a right. our courts seem to be oblivious to the need to 
inquire into the legitimacy of an objective meant to justify a limitation on 
freedom of expression; yet, one can hardly expect them to weigh the end to be 
served by a legislation with the intention of determining its proportionality with 
the degree or extent of limitation it imposes on freedom of expression.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this observation is not being made out 
of ignorance of the fact that ordinary courts in Ethiopia have a limited role to 
play in interpreting the Constitution. However, even if we take the most 
conservative view on the matter, according to which the courts have no direct 
role in the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, 
one cannot deny that ordinary courts can detect tensions that might exist 
between ordinary legislation and the Constitution and refer their queries to the 
House of Federation through the Council of Constitutional Inquiry.71 
Accordingly, even those who argue that ordinary courts are supposed to have a 
very passive role in enforcing fundamental freedoms will not deny the capacity 
and duty of courts to be sensitive to possible infringements of fundamental 
rights through ordinary statutes.
Despite this fact, the above cases show application of legislation without 
showing any regard to the apparent or real tension between the provisions being 
cited by a public prosecutor and the Constitution. For instance, in Public 
Prosecutor v Ibrahim M. (Cr.F.N 71562), the judge was clearly of the opinion 
that the legislation being relied upon by the prosecutor was one that imposed a 
limitation on freedom of expression based on the content of and effect of the 
viewpoint that is being expressed. Given that Article 29(6) of the Constitution 
rejects limitations on freedom of expression based on the content of and effect 
of the view point that is being expressed, the judge should have referred the 
matter to the Council of Constitutional inquiry.
in light of this discussion, the most plausible conclusion is only one that 
underscores the dire state in which the jurisprudence of freedom of expression 
finds itself at the moment. unfortunately, the judiciary, the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry alongside the House of Federation, and the academia 
could not be said to have succeeded in giving meaning to Article 29 of the 
FDRE Constitution. The same could be said about many of the important
71 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No.25012001, Article 21 (1 &2).
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provisions of the Constitution. But maintaining our focus on freedom of 
expression, we can observe the clear dearth of scholarly exposition and doctrinal 
writings that touch upon the questions raised in the preceding section of this 
article. Most unfortunately, the decisions of the ordinary courts and also that of 
the House of Federation and the Council of Constitutional inquiry do not 
provide any consolation.
5. The Practical Implications of Our Jurisprudential Dearth in
Freedom of Expression
The dearth, if not the virtual absence, of any case law and comprehensive 
doctrinal interpretation of freedom of expression that provide authoritative 
answers to the questions raised in Section 3 above is not to be lamented just 
because of the intellectual impoverishment that it indicates. This 
impoverishment has serious practical consequences that surpass the realm of 
juridical science. From a more practical point of view, this jurisprudential dearth 
means constant uncertainties as to what expressive conducts are protected and 
what is not protected under Article 29 of the FDRE Constitution. it also means 
lesser and weaker restraints on the state’s ability to restrict freedom of 
expression. For the bearers of any civil and political right to fully enjoy their 
right, a strong guarantee of their right that seals off the core of the right from 
governmental interference is very crucial. Such strong guarantees can hardly be 
said to exist in the absence of a bright line that delineates the core of the 
protected sphere from the unprotected. The fact that we have not developed a 
meaningful freedom of expression jurisprudence in Ethiopia so far has meant 
that nobody can say for certain where this line is. This in turn makes freedom of 
expression more vulnerable to violation and it also has led to a situation where 
‘freedom of expression’ has come closer to becoming a platitude rather than a 
concrete legal right.
As things stand today, like most provisions within the bill of rights of the 
FDRE Constitution, Article 29 appears to be a hazy and rosy assemblage of 
noble minded assertions the full potential of which has yet to be realized on the 
ground. A great deal of cynicism72 surrounds these provisions of the 
Constitution because not so many seem to pay much attention to them except for 
the purpose of political rhetoric. They are not considered useful in resolving 
legal problems. Nor are they considered as giving rise to legally enforceable 
and tangible rights. Even in the circle of legal professionals, be it among
72 Tsegaye Regassa (2009), ‘Making Legal Sense of Human Rights: The Judicial Role 
in Protecting Human Rights in Ethiopia’, Mizan Law Review, Vol.3, No.2. pp 305­
306.
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academics or practitioners, there is a view that human rights are a) the stuff of 
the naive human rights activist who cannot be considered as a serious and hard 
nosed lawyer even if his professional training is in law; or, b) the stuff of the 
opportunist who is milking human rights for financial and political gain.
In the midst of all this skepticism that broods over freedom of expression 
and like liberties, the losers will be the bearers of these rights who are supposed 
to enjoy these fundamental rights. This loss might not be evident in material 
terms. However, the loss is immeasurable for those who believe that these 
freedoms originate from and are manifestations of the inherent worth and 
dignity of human beings.
Furthermore, the vulnerability of freedom of expression and its want of 
robust protection has obvious adverse implications for our democratic 
aspirations. The weak protection of freedom of expression inevitably and 
naturally results in an arrested democratic development. it stuns the emergence 
of a tolerant civic culture that prefers deliberation and dialogue over 
confrontation and violence. All these contribute to the persistence of violent 
conflicts and poverty in our society. The absence of public deliberation and 
discourse gives rise to many societal ills in every aspect of life.
6. The Causes Explored
When we inquire into the causes that might have resulted in the jurisprudential 
dearth we find ourselves in, many possible causes come to mind. one important 
cause that seems to have contributed significantly to the current dismal state of 
the jurisprudence of freedom of expression in Ethiopia seems to be the low 
threshold of tolerance that exist for political dissent and vocal critique in the 
country.73 While the current government of Ethiopia has exhibited, relatively 
speaking, a greater deal of tolerance to political criticism and dissent compared 
with previous regimes, its level of tolerance still seems to fall short of what is 
provided under the FDRE Constitution.74 The overwhelming dominance of the 
apparatus of power by one party means that the party’s political imperative of 
prevailing over all opponents and critiques will lead to the suppression of 
freedom of expression.
73 See supra note 17.
74 See for example U.S Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor 2008 Human Rights Reports: Ethiopia, available at 
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119001.htm> and last accessed on 
October 29, 2010.
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Furthermore, the dominant-state political culture of the state, which is not 
entirely friendly to freedom of expression, also compounds the problem.75 Even 
when a deliberate policy is not pursued towards silencing the most potent 
critiques and potential challengers, the deeply rooted culture of perceiving 
opposition as rebellion and equating dissent with treason does not provide the 
most favorable setting for the development of free speech jurisprudence. The 
dominant political culture is such that critique and dissent is to be manifested 
either in oblique double entendre or in outright rebellion in the battlefield.76
This cultural orientation, deeply embedded in the dominant Ethiopian 
political psyche naturally favors passive acceptance of any limitation on 
freedom of expression relying on the truism that the freedom is not an absolute 
one. Here it should be underscored that what is being indicted as intolerant of 
dissent is the dominant-state political culture in modern Ethiopia. This does not 
negate the fact that the existence of a democratic political culture among various 
Ethiopian ethnic groups. Unfortunately the dominant-state political culture in 
modern Ethiopia had been impervious to the inspiration and lessons that should 
have been drawn from the democratic practices and traditions of such groups.
in addition to the above factors, the uncertainty and confusion that bedevils 
the judiciary as to its role in the enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in 
the Constitution is also another important factor that might have contributed to 
the current jurisprudential state of freedom of expression in Ethiopia.77 In this 
confusion, a significant portion of members of the legal profession have come to 
believe that the Constitution is off limits as far as the judiciary is concerned and 
that constitutional provisions could not be invoked in ordinary courts. While 
there is no evidence that this is a view that is dominant or even widespread, the 
fact remains that the judiciary in Ethiopia is quite weary of being seen engaged 
in any exercise that could be construed as a usurpation of the House of 
Federation's power of constitutional interpretation. One can hardly 
overemphasize the extent to which the judiciary’s reluctance to expound on
75 See Donald N. Levine (1965), Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian 
Culture, (reprinted by Tsehai Publishers). See also, J. Abrink (2006), “Discomfiture 
of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia in and Its Aftermath”, Journal 
of African Affairs, p.193, see also Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll (2003), “The 
Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life,” (Sida Studies), pp.32­
35.
76 Ibid.
77 See Yonatan Tesfaye, Whose Power is It Anyways: The Courts and Constitutional 
Interpretation in Ethiopia’, Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 22, No. 1 for a discussion 
of the debate regarding the proper role of courts in interpreting and enforcing the 
constitution.
4(2) Mizan Law Rev. Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia: The Jurisprudential Dearth 231
constitutional rights , at least by mediating access to these rights through various 
international human rights treaties, is hindering the development of our own 
human rights jurisprudence.
Furthermore, another factor that might contribute to the rudimentary 
condition of the jurisprudence on freedom of expression in Ethiopia at the 
moment is the fact that members of the legal profession have very little 
familiarity with the rationale, content and scope of freedom of expression as a 
legal right.78 Their stay in law school and their professional experience seems to 
have hardly offered most legal experts with a meaningful knowledge of the legal 
issues that arise in relation to freedom of expression.
Conclusions
in this article, we have raised some questions pertaining to freedom of 
expression under the FDRE Constitution. Alongside these questions, some 
tentative answers for the questions have been forwarded. At the same time, the 
author has tried to show through a discussion of some cases that these questions 
have yet to be answered in an authoritative manner. This in turn leads to a 
conclusion that there is a jurisprudential dearth in Ethiopia as far as freedom of 
expression is concerned. The author has also explored the practical implications 
and causes of this void.
it has been argued that the void in jurisprudence regarding freedom of 
expression has adverse implications for the enjoyment of the right, for the 
dignity of the bearers of the right and for the development of a democratic order 
and culture that could help us overcome many of the political and economic 
challenges we face as a society. Furthermore, the author has argued that the 
causes of the jurisprudential dearth could be the logic of political power, the 
undemocratic political culture of the Ethiopian polity, the limited constitutional 
role of courts in interpreting the Constitution and the low level of familiarity 
Ethiopian lawyers have with the intricate issues that arise in relation to freedom 
of expression. Hopefully, the situation will not remain so dire and will change 
for the better. of course, this can happen only if those entrusted with the task of 
constitutional interpretation, the judiciary and the legal academia discharge the 
duty they owe to society. _________ ■
78 Hopefully, the inclusion of a course on media law in the new curriculum of legal 
education will address this problem. See the JLSRI Syllabi Catalogue (2008), 
Unpublished, p. 520.
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